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Corruption in the media's gaze
This paper examines a government's incentive to engage in corruption in the presence of independent media. Different versions of a sequential-move game show how collusion between a media-firm and a government as well as a government's ability to ‘spin’ the media allegations can undermine corruption deterrence. Further, because of gains from exposing scandal, the media-firm can face incentives to raise false allegations. The paper shows how such false allegations can provide perverse incentives that favor corruption.
History
Journal
European journal of political economyVolume
21Issue
3Pagination
667 - 687Publisher
Elsevier BVLocation
Amsterdam, NetherlandsPublisher DOI
ISSN
0176-2680eISSN
1873-5703Language
engPublication classification
C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journalCopyright notice
2005, Elsevier BVUsage metrics
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