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The origins of formal collusion in Australian fire insurance 1870-1920
The market for insurance has become increasingly competitive in recent years. However, it has not always been so. At the end of the nineteenth century, it was characterized by a highly concentrated and tightly controlled oligopolistic market structure. As such, the history of the fire insurance industry provides an interesting case study in the development of collusive behaviour amongst firms. Up to 1897, pricing agreements among firms were generally short-lived, and were followed by periods of intense competition. After this point, an agreement was forged, which proved very resilient to market pressures and formed the basis of premium rate setting until the 1970s. This paper investigates the difference between this agreement and previous efforts to set premium rates, and points to some of the common features of the later compact, which explain its longevity.
History
Journal
Australian economic history reviewVolume
42Issue
1Pagination
54 - 76Publisher
Blackwell Publishers LtdLocation
Oxford, EnglandPublisher DOI
ISSN
0004-8992eISSN
1467-8446Language
engPublication classification
C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journalCopyright notice
Blackwell Publishers Ltd and the Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, 2002Usage metrics
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