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The role of dividends, debt and board structure in the governance of family controlled firms

journal contribution
posted on 2009-09-01, 00:00 authored by L Setia-Atmaja, George TanewskiGeorge Tanewski, M Skully
We investigate whether family controlled firms use dividends, debt and board structure to exacerbate or mitigate agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders in a capital market environment with high investor protection and private benefits of control. Results indicate family controlled firms employ higher dividend payout ratios, higher debt levels and lower levels of board independence compared to non-family firms. This suggests family controlled firms use either dividends or debt as a substitute for independent directors. We also find that dividends and debt are more effective governance mechanisms in mitigating the families’ expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth. Independent directors are, in contrast, more effective in controlling owner-manager conflict in non-family firms.

History

Journal

Journal of business finance and accounting

Volume

36

Issue

7-8

Pagination

863 - 898

Publisher

Wiley

Location

Chichester, Eng.

ISSN

0306-686X

eISSN

1468-5957

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal; C Journal article

Copyright notice

2009, The Authors

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